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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Anthony Ortega appeals, contending that the district court erred when it allowed
the State to present evidence of prior bad acts when they were not relevant to any
legitimate purpose.

Mr. Ortega also asserts that the district court erred by not

instructing the jury that reasonable parenting efforts cannot be the basis for a conviction
for injury to a child. Mr. Ortega requests this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court's decisions to allow the presentation of the propensity evidence and not
give the proposed instruction on reasonable parenting efforts, and remand this case for
a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Ortega was indicted on two counts of felony injury to a child pursuant to
I.C. § 18-1501, alleging that he had caused a fracture to his son's, "AO.", arm and
caused bruising to his buttocks, abdomen, and chest. (R., pp.22-23.) The district court
subsequently granted the State's motion to file an Information Part II, alleging that
Mr. Ortega was a persistent violator. (R., pp.60-62.)
Thereafter, the State filed a notice of intent to use propensity evidence,
specifically, testimony of Byron Stewart (the significant other of AO.'s maternal
grandmother, Tina Curtis) to the effect that Mr. Stewart had seen Mr. Ortega grab AO.'s
arm and yank him around by it. (R., pp.71-72.) At a pretrial hearing three days later,
before a response had been filed by the defense, the district court indicated that it would
be allowing the State to present that evidence, with the caveat that the event had to be
close in time to the conduct alleged in the indictment. (R., p.73; Tr., Vol.1, p.15, L.19-
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p.16, L.1.) 1 Two days later, Mr. Ortega filed a motion to reconsider the order granting
the State's motion to use the propensity evidence. (R., pp.87-89.)

In that motion,

defense counsel also indicated that, besides Mr. Stewart's proposed testimony about
prior bad acts,2 there was proposed testimony regarding prior bad acts from Ms. Curtis,3
as well as AO.'s maternal great-grandmother, Carma Pirrong,4 regarding Mr. Ortega's
approach to disciplining AO. (R., p.88.)

1 The transcripts in this case are contained in three independently bound and paginated
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol. 1" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts
from the pretrial hearings held on August 6,2012, October 15, 2012, October 22,2012,
October 29, 2012, and November 5, 2012. "VoI.2" will refer to the volume containing
the transcripts from the jury trial held on November 27, 28, and 29, 2012. "VoI.3" will
refer to the volume containing the transcript from the sentencing hearing held on
March 14, 2013.
2 Mr. Stewart ultimately testified that he had seen Mr. Ortega slap AO. in an effort to get
AO.'s attention when AO. had been biting "B.S." (the son of Ms. Curtis and
Mr. Stewart, who was a few months younger than AO.). (Tr., Vo1.2, p.186, L.25 - p.187,
L.13.) Mr. Stewart testified that AO.'s lips had begun to bleed as a result. (Tr., Vo1.2,
p.187, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Stewart also testified that he had seen Mr. Ortega grab AO. by the
arm while AO. was running around, which caused AO. to turn around in a quick,
jerking motion to face Mr. Ortega. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.195, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Stewart testified
that he had pulled Mr. Ortega aside after both incidents to reprimand such behavior,
admitting that he had gone so far as to threaten Mr. Ortega after the arm incident.
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.193, L.19 - p.194, L.4.) However, he also noted that Mr. Ortega appeared
to be receptive of these criticisms and was trying to be a good father to AO. (Tr., Vo1.2,
p.185, L.18 - p.186, L.4; Tr., Vo1.2, p.188, L.19 - p.189, L.2.) Mr. Stewart also admitted
he had seen Mr. Ortega mete out appropriate discipline for AO. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.189,
Ls.5-9.)
3 Ms. Curtis ultimately testified that she had witnessed Mr. Ortega spank AO. hard
enough to leave marks on AO.'s buttocks, and that AO. had talked to her about those
incidents, showing her the marks. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.164, LS.1 0-18; Tr., Vo1.2, p.165, Ls.6-8.)
Ms. Curtis also testified that she had seen some bruises on AO. which she said were a
result of his potty training, and occurred even after she gave Mr. Ortega a child potty
training toilet to use.
(Tr. Vo1.2, p.170, Ls.19-24; Tr., Vo1.2, p.173, Ls.10-13.)
Additionally, she testified that she had no qualms about leaving B.S. in Mr. Ortega's
care. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.166, Ls.3-9.) Ms. Curtis testified that, on the whole, she thought
Mr. Ortega was working to be a good father to AO. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.163, Ls.11 - p.164,
L.5.)
4 Ms. Pirrong testified that she had seen Mr. Ortega grab AO.'s nose hard enough to
leave red marks when AO. was misbehaving at the shoe store. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.204,
Ls.5-18.) She also testified that the bruises on A.O.'s buttocks appeared to be the
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Mr. Ortega contended that none of those witnesses would be able to offer any
testimony speaking to the events at issue, and that such testimony would only serve to
prejudice the jury against Mr. Ortega. (R., p.88.) He also indicated his intent to argue
that AO. had broken his arm falling out of the car, not as a result of Mr. Ortega's
actions. (R., p.88.) The State argued that Mr. Stewart's evidence was relevant to the
question of intent or absence of mistake or accident, and therefore, was permissible
under !.R.E. 404(b). (Tr., Vol. 1, p.20, Ls.5-15.) The district court determined that the
evidence was relevant and outweighed the prejudice to Mr. Ortega because the conduct
that Mr. Stewart would be testifying to was close enough in time to the events covered
by the indictment. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.21, Ls.1-11.) Therefore, it held that the State would be
allowed to present the propensity evidence. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.21, Ls.10-11.)
Mr. Ortega also requested that the district court instruct the jury pursuant to
State v. Peters, 116 Idaho 851 (Ct. App. 1989), that:

The State of Idaho recognizes that a parent may punish a child using a
reasonable amount of force to safeguard and promote the child's welfare.
A parent may punish a minor child for wrongdoing so long as such
punishment is for this beneficial purpose. The punishment must not be
excessive and the degree of harm to the child must not exceed what is
commonly viewed as reasonable in light of the circumstances.
(R., pp.84-85.) The district court decided not to give that instruction for three reasons:
(1) there was no pattem jury instruction on that issue; (2) the language in Peters upon
which the proposed instruction was based was dicta; and (3) giving the proposed
instruction would confuse the jury. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.441 , L.13 - p.443, L.6.) It did indicate
that defense counsel could argue that premise under the instructions as given.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.443, Ls.7-10; see R., pp.121-39.)

result of him sitting down on something hard. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.209, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Pirrong
current has custody of AO. (Tr., Vo!.2, p.214, Ls.1 O~15.)

3

The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Ortega as charged.

(R., pp.140-41.) It also

convicted him on the persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.144.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, on each count, and
ordered those sentences to run concurrently.

(Tr., Vo1.3, p.25, Ls.12-17; R., p.149.)

Mr. Ortega filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.153-55.)

4

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of prior
bad acts that were irrelevant to any legitimate issues.

2.

Whether the district court erred by not giving the requested jury instruction on
reasonable parenting efforts.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Present Evidence Of Prior Bad Acts
That Were Irrelevant To Any Legitimate Issues

A.

Standard Of Review
Evidence of prior bad acts is generally not admissible to show character or

propensity. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013); I.R.E. 404(b). However, such evidence
may be admitted if it is relevant to prove some legitimate fact, specifically, motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. Joy, 155 Idaho at 8. Thus, the review for the admission of such evidence is
two-fold: '''(1) whether, under I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is relevant as a matter of law
to an issue other than the defendant's character or criminal propensity; and (2) whether,
under I.R.E. 403, the district court abused its discretion in fining the probative value of
the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the
defendant.'" Joy, 155 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010)).
The first step in this review scheme (relevance) is an issue of law and so the appellate
courts exercise free review, while the second step (weight) is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. 5 State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214 (Ct. App. 2009).

B.

Since Mr. Ortega's Intent Was Not Put At Issue, The Propensity Evidence
Offered In This Case Was Irrelevant For Any Legitimate Purpose
In cases dealing with potential child abuse, evidence of prior bad acts has been

held relevant to the defendant's intent or absence of mistake or accident. See, e.g.,

5 There is one other preliminary point of review that exists: whether the evidence of the
prior conduct is sufficiently established as fact. Mr. Ortega did not challenge this below.
Compare Joy, 155 Idaho at 9 n.4.
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State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 170 (1985), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 722-23 (1992); State v. Hassett, 124 Idaho 357, 362 (Ct App.
1993); State v. Sanchez, 94 Idaho 125, 128 (1971). However, such evidence is only
admissible if the defendant's intent is sufficiently at issue in the case. See, e.g., State v.

Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,219-20 (Cl. App. 2009) (discussing State v. Roach, 109 Idaho
973 (Ct. App. 1985»; see also Joy, 155 Idaho at 8 (holding such evidence is only
admissible if it is "'relevant as a matter of law to a material and disputed issue other
than the character or criminal propensity of the defendant''') (quoting State v. Pepcom,
152 Idaho 678, 688 (2012» (emphasis added).
For example, in Roach, the theory of defense was that the defendant did not
commit the acts alleged, as opposed to contending that he had touched the victim with
some innocent intent. Roach, 109 Idaho at 975. The Court of Appeals concluded that
defense did not bring the defendant's intent into question.

Id.; see also State v.

Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 156 (et. App. 1986) (reaching the same conclusion);
compare State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 342-43 (et. App. 2010) (distinguishing
Roach because the defendant's intent to steal was the only element of the offense that
was at issue); State v. McGuire, 135 Idaho 535, 538 (el. App. 2001) (noting that the
defendant had put his intent at issue by forwarding the defense that he had touched the
victim, but did so without lewd intent, and therefore, holding that the propensity
evidence in that case was relevant). As such, where the intent element is not a material
and disputed issue, admission of propensity evidence in regard to the defendant's intent
or the absence of mistake or accident is in error. Joy, 155 Idaho at 8; Roach, 109 Idaho
at 975.
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In this case, as in Roach, Mr. Ortega did not put intent at issue. His defense
theory was that AO. had fallen out of the car and landed on his arm, causing the break.
(See Tr., Vo1.2, p.107, LS.6-8 (defense counsel telling the jury: "Why we are here is we
have a fundamental disagreement on how those [injuries] got there"); Tr., Vo1.2, p.496,
L.21 - p.497, L.8 (defense counsel arguing to the jury that, on the 911 recording,
"[Mr. Ortega's] voice and his tone is not that of someone who is frustrated and has
snapped at his kid, but somebody who is legitimately concerned about their child being
hurt .... That's not the kind of reaction of somebody who just abused their child and
cased a spiral fracture is going to display").) This defense did not contend that, while
Mr. Ortega had grabbed AO.'s arm, he had done so with some innocent intent.
In that regard, the "absence of accident" is not implicated in this case.

See

Parmer, 147 Idaho at 219-20. The fact that Mr. Ortega argued that the injury to AO.'s
arm was the product of an "accidental" fall - that AO. slipped from Mr. Ortega's grasp
while Mr. Ortega was helping AO. out of the car (see, e.g., Tr., Vo1.2, p.138, L.24p.139, L.1 (paramedic McKenna's recollection of Mr. Ortega's account of the incident);
State's Exhibit 1 (recording 911 call which includes Mr. Ortega's account of the
incident)) - did not implicate the question of intent. Compare Roach, 109 Idaho at 975
with McGuire, 135 Idaho at 538. That justification is inapplicable where the defendant is
arguing the injury was the result of forces besides his own. In child abuse cases, the
absence of accident theory could arguably be applicable if the defendant were
contending that he had grabbed the victim's arm to get his attention (engaged in the
action with innocent intent) and, as a result of that action, accidentally broke the victim's
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arm.6 However, given the facts of this case, the absence of accident is not a proper
justification for admission of prior bad act evidence.
Therefore, the evidence of Mr. Ortega's parenting techniques was not relevant to
a material and disputed issue, and thus, was inadmissible. See Joy, 155 Idaho at 8;
compare Roach, 109 Idaho at 975.

As such, this Court should reverse the district

court's decision to allow the propensity evidence and remand this case for a new trial.

C.

Even If The 404(b) Evidence Was Somehow Relevant, Its Minimal Probative
Value Was Substantially Outweighed By The Prejudicial Effect Of That Evidence
Even when propensity evidence is relevant to some material and disputed issue

in a case, it still must survive the balancing test set forth in I.RE. 403. Such evidence is
inadmissible if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of
presenting that evidence.

I.RE. 403.

To have probative value, the evidence would

have "'any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.'" State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 597, 605 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting I.RE. 401)
(emphasis added); see also Joy, 155 Idaho at 8 (holding that propensity evidence
needs to be relevant to a material and disputed issue). The Idaho Rules of Evidence,
particularly Rules 404 and 609, implicitly recognize that evidence of prior bad acts is
inherently prejudicial. State v. Bingham, 124 Idaho 698, 701-02 (1993).
The propensity evidence presented by the State in this case (dealing with
Mr. Ortega's parenting methods) is minimally probative as to the injuries alleged in the

6 In such a circumstance, there would still be a legal question of admissibility, since the
prior evidence would only be admissible if the court operated under the presumption
that, because Mr. Ortega disciplined his child in that manner before, he must have done
so on the occasion in question. That assumption is exactly the type of argument
!.R.E. 404(b) is designed to prevent the jury from hearing.
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indictment, considering none of the witnesses offering the propensity evidence testified
that they saw Mr. Ortega do anything to cause those injuries.

(See R, pp.87-88.)

Therefore, the probative value of that evidence to a fact of consequence to the
determination of the action is minimal at best.

As such, the prejudice caused by

allowing the jury to hear several witnesses opine about his poor parenting choices
substantially outweighs that minimal probative value of that evidence. As such, even if
the propensity evidence were somehow relevant, it should still have been excluded
under I.RE. 403. Compare Bingham, 124 Idaho at 702 (finding that the district court
erred by admitting minimally-probative propensity evidence).
The district court's assessment of the evidence under I.RE. 403 focused only on
the temporal proximity of the alleged uncharged conduct to the charged conduct.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.32, Ls.1-11.)

That fact, however, is insufficient to make the evidence

admissible under I.RE. 404. Joy, 155 Idaho at 11. In Joy, the Idaho Supreme Court
held that:
While the events are similar and occurred close together in time, they do
not constitute 'a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of
two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the other,' as required by [State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2008)].
Rather they are merely suggestive of Preston's predisposition for domestic
violence, precisely the kind of character evidence barred by Rule 404.
Id. (emphasis from original). The Supreme Court has made it clear that such evidence

is neither relevant nor probative to the material and disputed facts, and as such, would
fail to meet either prong of the 404(b) test. Furthermore, this evidence only serves to
paint Mr. Ortega as a person whose efforts have gotten out of hand in the past, and
thus, must have excessively disciplined A.O. on the occasions in question. Therefore, it
is inherently prejudicial propensity evidence.

See Bingham, 124 Idaho at 701-02.

Given that, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, the temporal proximity is minimally
10

relevant at best, the prejudicial effect of that evidence substantially outweighs the
probative value of that evidence. As a result, even if the propensity evidence is found to
be relevant, this Court should still reverse the district court's decision to allow the
propensity evidence and remand the case for a new trial.

II.

The District Court Erred By Not Giving The Requested Jury Instruction On Reasonable
Parenting Efforts
A.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction

where 'there is a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that would
support' the theory."

State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 247-48 (2008) (quoting

State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 90 (1992». As such, when a reasonable view of the
evidence supports the instruction, that subject is not covered elsewhere in the
instructions, and the proposed instruction does not improperly comment on the
evidence, the "requested instruction on governing law must be given." State v. Fetterly,
126 Idaho 475, 476-77 (Ct. App. 1994).

If the proposed instruction is justified, but

misstates the law, "the trial court is 'under the affirmative duty to properly instruct the
jury.'"

Id. (quoting Eastman, 122 Idaho at 91). As such, the district court's failure to

give such an instruction is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 143 Idaho
155, 158 (Ct. App. 2006).

B.

The Evidence Presented In This Case Warranted An Instruction Regarding
Reasonable Parenting Efforts
Mr. Ortega requested that the district court give an instruction based on the Court

of Appeals' decision in State v. Peters, 116 Idaho 851, 855 (Ct. App. 1989).
11

(R., pp.84-85.) In Peters, the Court of Appeals considered the defendant's claim that
the injury to a child statute (I.C. § 18-1501) was void for vagueness.

See id.

In

determining the statute met constitutional requirements, the Court of Appeals noted:
[A] parent may punish a child using a reasonable amount of force to
safeguard and promote the child's welfare. A parent may punish a minor
child for wrongdoing so long as such punishment is for this beneficial
purpose. The punishment may not be excessive and the degree of harm
to the child must not exceed what is commonly viewed as reasonable in
light of the circumstances.
Id.

This understanding was consistent with Idaho Supreme Court precedent which

recognized that "reasonable parenting efforts" served as a defense to an allegation of
child abuse:

"In this case, appellant's major defense was that his actions only

constituted an overabundance of discipline, without the intent to cause pain and
suffering. The state's only chance to refute that defense . .. would be to introduce other
evidence which might tend to show that appellant's treatment of this victim was for
purposes other than discipline." State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 170 (1985), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 722-23 (1992) (emphasis added);
cf Barker v. Barker, 92 Idaho 204, 206 (1968) ("Appellant's testimony concerning

respondent's sometime physical discipline of the children indicates no more than normal
parental control and certainly does not suggest child abuse.") (emphasis added).
Such an understanding of the statute, according to subsequent decisions by both
the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals, is necessary because "Idaho
Code section 18-1501 (1) is a criminal statute not a barometer for stupidity."
State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373 (2002). '''The purpose of the statute is not to punish

mistakes in judgment that are reviewed in hindsight. . . . Otherwise custodians of
children may be subjected to criminal penalties for good faith decisions that turn out
poorly-innocent mistakes in judgment.'" State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 169-70
12

(Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Young, 138 Idaho at 373). In short, Idaho law clearly allows a
parent to defend against a charge of child abuse by asserting a defense of reasonable
parenting efforts. It follows that the question of whether the defendant-parent's efforts
were reasonable or criminal is a matter for the jury to decide.
To that point, in Ha/besleben, the Court of Appeals observed that "[t]he
Halbeslebens presented evidence that they believed, in good faith that the diet they
were feeding Tommy was nutritionally adequate and an appropriate means of discipline.
The instructions [given in that case] allowed the Halbeslebens, like the defendant in
Young, to be convicted even if they made a good faith mistake." Id. As a result of those

inadequate jury instructions, the Court of Appeals vacated the conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial. Id. at 171. The specific problem in those instructions was that
the instruction on the definition of "willful" was insufficient to protect against this
situation. Id. at 170; see also Young, 138 Idaho at 373. In both cases, the district court
used the statutory definition of "willful" from I.C. § 18-101(1). Young, 138 Idaho at 373;
Halbes/eben, 139 Idaho at 170.

However, in the context of a charge pursuant to

I.C. § 18-1501, "[a]t best this [definition] is confusing. At worst, it misstates the law-it
allowed Young to be convicted even if he made a good faith mistake believing the
treatment he provided was adequate for the [child's] injuries." Young, 138 Idaho at 373.
Basically, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the defendant in Young could have been
found to have made a reasonable parenting decision regarding the treatment his child
needed, regardless of the outcome of that decision. See id. In that case, the defendant
could not be convicted under I.C. § 18-1501. See id.; see also Halbes/eben, 139 Idaho
at 170.
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Like the defendants in Young and Halbesleben, Mr. Ortega was charged with
violating I.C. § 18-1501. (R., p.22.) Also like the defendants in Young and Halbesleben,
Mr. Ortega was contending that his actions toward his child were reasonable parenting
measures. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.500, L.16 - p.502, L.14.) And, like the defendants in Young
and Halbesleben, the only instruction given in this regard was the definition of "willfully"
from I.C. § 18-101(1). (See R., p.134.) The only difference is that Mr. Ortega presented
the district court with a proposed instruction that would inform the jury of this governing
law.

(R., pp.84-85.)

Therefore, since a reasonable juror could conclude that

Mr. Ortega's actions, particularly those dealing with the charged conduct, were
reasonable (if misguided) parenting efforts - trying to discipline a child and helping a
child out of a car - since the other instructions clearly were insufficient in this regard,
and since it could be presented in a way that did not comment on the evidence, the
district court was obligated to give the proposed instruction.

Pearce, 146 Idaho at

247-48; Eastman, 122 Idaho at 90; Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476-77.
The district court's reasons for not giving the instruction are baseless and/or
directly contrary to established precedent.

Its first reason for rejecting the proposed

instruction was that it was not contained in the pattern instructions. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.441 ,
15-18.)

"The Idaho Supreme Court approved the pattern jury instructions and has

recommended that the trial courts use the instructions unless a different instruction

would more adequately, accurately, or clearly state the law." State v. Ruel, 141 Idaho
600, 602 (Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added).

Additionally, the Supreme Court has

addressed this issue in its introduction to the jury instructions:
[J]udges and lawyers should note that these instructions cannot possibly
cover all of the legal issues on which a jury may need guidance in a
particular case. Matters of law not covered by these instructions ... may
arise in a criminal case. .. A trial judge should remain vigilant in
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observing the duty set forth in Idaho Code §19-2132: "In charging the
jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for their
information."
Idaho

Supreme

Court

website,

"Introduction

and

General

Directions

for

Use," http://isc.idaho.gov/problem-solving/criminal-jury-instructions (last visited Nov. 13,
2013). The need for an additional instruction in this regard is especially evident in this
case, since the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have indicated that
the pattern instructions are insufficient in this area.

See Young, 138 Idaho at 373;

Halbes/eben, 139 Idaho at 170. Therefore, the district court's decision to refuse to give

a proposed instruction simply because there is no pattern instruction on that particular
point is clearly erroneous.
The district court's second reason for rejecting the proposed instruction is that
the section of Peters after which defense counsel modeled the proposed instruction was
discussing whether the statute itself was unconstitutionally vague, and thus, was not on
point. (Tr., Vo1.2, p,441 , L 19 - p,443, L6.) As discussed supra, even if the language in
Peters is dicta, it was consistent with Idaho Supreme Court precedent and the Idaho

Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have since made it eminently clear that it
was a correct statement of law. As such, even though that language in Peters may be
dicta, it is still a correct statement of the law and the theory therein was supported by a

reasonable view of the evidence. See, Young, 138 Idaho at 373; Stuart, 110 Idaho at
170; Halbes/eben, 139 Idaho at 170. Therefore, the district court was duty-bound to

give the correct instruction of the law that was supported by the evidence. Pearce, 146
Idaho at 247-48; Eastman, 122 Idaho at 90; Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476-77.
The district court's final reason for rejecting the proposed instruction was that it
believed it would result in potential confusion to the jury. (Tr., Vo1.2, p,442, Ls.15-20.)
15

That concern, however, was dealt with by the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in
Young, which pointed out that absent some instruction to that end, the instructions were

already, at best, confusing, and at worst, a misrepresentation of the law. Young, 138
Idaho at 373. Therefore, the proposed instruction, according to controlling precedent,
would remedy potential confusion, not create it. See id. As such, the district court's
final concern is revealed to be baseless. The proposed instruction was necessary and
should have been given. As such, this Court should vacate the conviction and remand
for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ortega respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court's decisions to allow the presentation of the propensity evidence and to not
give the reasonable parenting jury instruction, and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 18th day of November, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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